

# THE SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC CONTEXT\*

The Mediterranean has always been a tremendous crossroads of civilisation, a place of exchange where human mobility combines with the intermixing of cultures. It owes its existence primarily to the variety and intermarriage of its peoples.

The 20th century will come to be seen as the century of the demographic explosion. The world's population has now quadrupled to around 6.5 billion people. Although this demographic growth has slowed since the 1970s, it will probably still be necessary to wait until the middle of the 21st century for the world population to stabilise, probably at around 9 billion. In the meantime, the demographic map of the world will be re-drawn, since certain demographic zones are experiencing rapid population growth (Asia, Africa) while others, conversely, are stagnating in demographic terms (Europe). It is "continental demographic drift" (Chasteland and Chesnais, 2003).

The Mediterranean area is a perfect illustration of this global trend. The demographic stagnation of the northern shore contrasts with the demographic thrust of the southern. This contrast is highly significant in a regional context already marked by economic imbalances and differences in development. Examining the demographic trends of the Mediterranean countries is of crucial importance if one wishes to map the contours of the Mediterranean basin up to 2020 and highlight the development dynamics of the region and the profound social changes which accompany these demographic changes.

---

\* - This chapter was written on the basis of documents prepared by Sébastien Abis (Ciheam Secretariat) and Pierre Blanc (Ciheam-MAI Montpellier).

The method adopted here involves examining the demographic situation of the Mediterranean countries<sup>1</sup> whose aggregation, both at regional level (the Basin)<sup>2</sup> and subregional (the various geographical groupings),<sup>3</sup> provides a global overview of the population dynamics of the Mediterranean and shows general trends. This exercise also offers the possibility of examining the major socio-demographic challenges in the region up to 2020, a necessary exercise when considering the future of Mediterranean agriculture and the rural world.

## The demographic dynamics in the Mediterranean

The demographic dynamics in the Mediterranean countries between 1990 and 2020 probably deserve a separate work given the amount of data and analyses that can be drawn from them. There is, of course, no question here of presenting all the population statistics but rather of identifying the major demographic trends at work in the Mediterranean, among which six stand out.

### Demographic growth in the Mediterranean Basin is taking place in the South

The Mediterranean had 285 million inhabitants in 1970 and 378 million in 1990. In 2005, the population of the Basin was 454 million inhabitants (7% of the world's population on 6.3% of its land surface) and is likely to be around 520 million in 2020. The population is not far from doubling in the space of just half a century.

However, only the populations of the southern shore are currently increasing and will rise by 65% between 1990 and 2020, while the North Mediterranean countries achieve barely 8% population growth. The Mediterranean is split into two, with a North where the population is now scarcely increasing (+14 million people between 1990 and 2020) and a South where the population is exploding (+130 million people). Thus, while the North Mediterranean increases by one inhabitant, the South has ten new people, with the prospect of upsetting the demographic balance. While until the 1980s, the North Mediterranean more or less equalled the South Mediterranean, in 2020, two thirds of Mediterraneans will be located on the southern shore.

---

1 - These forecasts are based on data provided by the United Nations Population Division, which every two years publishes a statistical directory of world population, World Population Prospects, containing projections of numerous demographic variables for each of the countries of the world. The perspectives are a general authority for demographic work. For this study, the data collected and used come from the 2004 version using in each case the average assumed projections. Only the paragraph concerning overall population figures for the Mediterranean emphasises the range of United Nations projections, indicating the measurements with the low, median and high variants.

2 - According to the geographical perimeter defined for this study, 19 Mediterranean States are analysed here, either members of the European Union, or members of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, or concerned by the establishment of the European Neighbourhood Policy. Albania, a Member State of Ciheam, is associated with this analysis. A geographical distinction is deliberately made between the States of the northern shore (Albania, Cyprus, France, Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal and Spain) and the States of the southern shore (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey and the Palestinian Authority).


3 - For this study, apart from the distinction drawn between the northern and southern shore (which also includes the eastern shore) four other geographical categories were defined: the European Mediterranean (Cyprus, France, Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal and Spain), the zone of the of Arab Mediterranean countries partners of the European Union (Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia and the Palestinian Territories), the Maghreb (Algeria, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia) and the Near East (Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and the Palestinian Authority). These distinctions are very useful in observing the different demographic dynamics in the Mediterranean.

This demographic vitality of the countries of the South needs to be qualified: they are not all growing at the same pace. The population is growing much faster in the Near East than in the Maghreb. While the demographic transition is now well established in the Maghreb, in Tunisia for example, certain countries are literally exploding between 1990 and 2020 (population 2.6 times higher in the Palestinian Territories and a twofold increase in Syria and Jordan). At the same time, the demographic ranking of countries is changing. In 1990, four States (Egypt, France, Italy and Turkey) had more or less the same population (55 to 57 million inhabitants). By 2020, two demographic giants are expected to dominate: Egypt (with some 95 million inhabitants) and Turkey (some 87 million inhabitants) making up 35% of the total population of the Mediterranean Basin. France and Italy, with 63 and 57 million inhabitants respectively, would then be outstripped.

The United Nations population projections for the Mediterranean up to 2020 give 502 million inhabitants for the low hypothesis and 543 million for the high hypothesis. Should these projections be challenged? The question is worth raising because some demographers, relying on a rapid decline in fecundity in the South Mediterranean countries, think that the population of the area will reach between 310 and 320 million

inhabitants in 2020 (Courbage, 1999), 10 to 20 million persons less than the United Nations data (Chart 1).

**Chart 1 - The population of the Mediterranean, 1990-2020**



Finally, considering the Euro-Mediterranean geopolitical area as a whole, i.e. the 27 Member States of the European Union (some 500 million inhabitants) and the Mediterranean partner countries (330 million inhabitants), there are some 830 million people, or 11% of the global population, who are likely to fill this space by 2020.

## Urbanisation, from ancient times, has been global and unstoppable


Whether in ancient times with Athens and Rome, in the Middle Ages with Venice and Constantinople or today with Barcelona, Alexandria or Algiers, the Mediterranean has always been marked by cities. In the mid 20th century, the Mediterranean already had some ten cities with a million or more inhabitants. Now there are around thirty, most of them on the coast.<sup>4</sup> Istanbul and Cairo could pass the official

<sup>4</sup> - According to the work of the Blue Plan, it is estimated that between 20 and 25% of the Mediterranean population was both urban and coastal (Benoit and Comeau, 2005).


figure of 15 million by 2015. And if the world had to wait until 2006 to see the number of urban dwellers exceed those in rural areas, the Mediterranean for its part has had an urban majority since the 1960s.

The urbanisation of the Mediterranean area is thus ancient, global and probably irreversible by 2020. The growth of cities continues, at an even faster pace than in past decades. The increase in urban populations is staggering: they have quite simply doubled between 1970 and 2005. Currently, 64% of Mediterraneans live in urban areas and the ratio could even reach as high as 68% by 2020. It is in the Maghreb and the Near East that the highest rates of urban growth in the region are recorded. Thus on the southern shore, the number of city-dwellers rises from 108 to 214 million between 1990 and 2020 (of each five additional inhabitants of the area, 4 will be city-dwellers) (Maps 1 and 2, Chart 2).

**Map 1 - The urban population of the Mediterranean, 2005**




**Map 2 - The urban population of the Mediterranean, 2005**




While the countries of the North became urbanised earlier, the countries of the South are rapidly catching up. Thus, by far the bulk of demographic growth in the Maghreb is now in cities. Between 1990 and 2020, the zone will have 35 million new city-dwellers compared with only 0.5 million new rural dwellers. This demographic surplus will be mainly the result of migration from the country to the cities, by far exceeding natural urban growth. This pace in the Maghreb, the fastest in the Mediterranean region, is also greater than the average registered at global level. On the northern shore, some countries are experiencing accelerated urbanisation (Albania, Portugal) and in 2020, 7 Mediterranean countries are likely to have over 80% of city-dwellers (France, Malta, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya and Spain).

The relations between town and country have changed in the last third of the 20th century. The interdependency of urban and rural areas in the countries of the southern shore was much stronger than now, where a new gap is forming. In the North Mediterranean, the phenomenon of “urbanisation” or the notorious “desire for the country” of urbanised European societies has helped in recent years to mitigate geographical distortions and invent new relations between town and country.

**Chart 2 - The urban population of the Mediterranean, 2005**



**Map 3 - The rural population of the Mediterranean, 2005**



Source: Our calculations based on United Nations (World Population Prospects 2004, medium hypothesis).

## The rural world is still populated


Despite this, the Mediterranean countryside is not in demographic decline. In 1990, the number of rural dwellers was 148 million for the Mediterranean as a whole. There were 164 million in 2005 and likely to remain the same in 2020. The region retains a profoundly rural character with a third of the population living in the country, now and in 2020. In the South, this ratio is as much as 41% today (Maps 3 and 4, Chart 3).

Here, too, there are major disparities. In the majority of countries of the North, the rural population will decline (Albania, Malta, Portugal, Lebanon, Libya and Morocco), while others, conversely, will experience sustained demographic growth in rural areas (Egypt, Israel, the Palestinian Territories, Syria and Jordan in particular). Thus for apparent growth of 2 million inhabitants in rural areas in the Mediterranean between 2005 and 2020, there will in fact be a decline of 6 million rural inhabitants in the North and an increase of 8 million in the South of the Basin (almost exclusively in Egypt).

Let us be quite clear: if the Mediterranean is becoming increasingly urban, both numerically and in relation to the total population, the rurality (the ratio of the rural population to the total) of Mediterranean societies is in steady decline.<sup>5</sup> This finding applies to all the countries of the Basin, both in the North and the South.


<sup>5</sup> - It is in the Maghreb that the most spectacular decline in rurality can be seen, with a variation index of - 35% compared with - 13% in the Near East. On a case by case basis, it is found that rurality is declining strongly in Malta (- 53,2%), Libya (- 49%) and Lebanon (- 45,2%). Egypt is by far the most rural country in the Mediterranean region, with 58% of rural dwellers today. But other States retain a much higher rural population than the regional average, such as Albania (55%), Portugal (44%), Syria (50%), Algeria (40%) or Morocco (41%).

**Map 4 - The rural population of the Mediterranean, 2005**



Source: Our calculations based on United Nations (World Population Prospects 2004, medium hypothesis).

**Chart 3 - The rural population of the Mediterranean, 2005**



However, for all that, under the effect of demographic growth, the rural world is not being depopulated in the South of the Mediterranean. In the Maghreb, the rural population is neither declining nor increasing and this trend is likely to continue. In the Near East, rural dwellers are likely to remain in large numbers and with an unchanged overall population. Here the weight of Egypt must be highlighted, as it could have 7 million new rural dwellers between 2005 and 2020 (out of a total of 18 million between 1990 and 2020). At that date, moreover, 30% of Mediterranean rural dwellers would be Egyptian. In this context, it is not irrelevant to mention the strategic importance of the agricultural sector. In 2003, the Mediterranean had a total of 38.5 active agricultural workers, of whom 86% were located in the countries of the Southern shore.<sup>6</sup>

## The South is undergoing a late but rapid demographic transition

Compared with Latin America or South-east Asia, the demographic transition of the countries of the South Mediterranean is taking place late, but at a more rapid pace than ever observed. Three indicators should be mentioned here:

- The demographic transition is observed through the significant decline in infant mortality. While it is true that the gap remains at 1 to 5 between the countries of the North and the countries of the South (5.7% 0 against

<sup>6</sup> - In 2003, it is estimated that a third of active workers in the countries of the southern shore worked in the agricultural sector. This ratio may rise to 44% in Turkey and 46% in Albania. There are 15 million active agricultural workers in Turkey and some 8.5 million in Egypt, thus the two countries account for 60% of all active agricultural workers in the Mediterranean Basin. These calculations were made on the basis of information available in the Directory *MedAgri 2006* (Allaya, 2006) drawing on FAO statistics.

25.9% 0), the latter are on the way to halving their infant mortality between 1990 and 2020 (from 38.6% 0 in 1990 to 18.6% 0 in 2020). Certain countries are recording even more spectacular progress, especially Egypt and Morocco which will reduce their infant mortality by two thirds in the same period.

- The extension of life expectancy is also part of this demographic trend. With advances in medicine and better living conditions, Mediterranean populations are living longer, up to 75 years on average in the Basin (or eight years more than globally). In the Maghreb, life expectancy is expected to rise from 68 to 75 years between 1990 and 2020, and in Egypt from 64 to 74 years. In the European countries of the North, the 80 year threshold has already been passed (Italy) or will shortly do so (Spain, France, Cyprus).
- Fecundity has been falling strongly for some years (Annex 1). It fell from an average of 6 children per woman in the 1970s to 4 children in 1990 and then to 3 today.<sup>7</sup> The Maghreb countries are particularly marked by this phenomenon: the forecast average for the region is for 2.1 children per woman by 2020. Tunisia is already below this threshold. This new reality is largely the fruit of the dissemination of contraceptive methods, especially in urban areas, and their use by women who thereby manage their sexuality more easily, even if governments have often presented this question as a matter of demographic control for the good of the country and less as a personal choice for women. In France, fecundity took about two centuries (mid-18th to mid 20th) to fall from 6 to 2 children per woman. The Maghreb countries will only need fifty years to complete the same journey (1970-2020). This abrupt decline in the countries of the South echoes the fecundity crisis in the majority of the countries of the northern shore, with very low indices in Spain, Italy and Greece, in particular, where, however, the number of children per woman was still high in the 1970s.

The scale and speed of this demographic transition in the South of the Mediterranean are such that the shift occurs without the country's economic and social structures having time to adjust.


## Demographic ageing is very rapid

The general demographic ageing of Mediterranean populations is the corollary of all the demographic dynamics described above. Age is increasing everywhere: between 1990 and 2020, it will rise by 33 to 38 years in the North and 19 to 24 years in the South. This demographic ageing appears much more pronounced in the Mediterranean than in the world in general and will primarily affect the Maghreb countries, since the average age there will rise by 19 to 31 years. In the great majority of cases, the age pyramid of the Mediterranean countries shows a contraction at the base in favour of a broadening of the mature age groups (40-70 years in the North) or intermediate groups (20-40 years in the South) (Chart 4).

7 - In the Mediterranean, the fecundity index declines steadily between 1990 and 2020, from an average of 3.07 to 2.07. This is a significant decline, more rapid than observed at global level (from 3.04 to 2.38). Spain and Italy had the lowest fecundity indexes of the Mediterranean zone during the decade of the 1990s, now it is Greece where the index is lowest. It is collapsing in Malta, Cyprus and Albania. By 2020, apart from the Palestinian Territories, no southern shore State should have a fecundity index higher than 2.6.



**Chart 4 - Average age of the population, 1990-2020**



Although they still have a very young population, the countries of the southern Mediterranean are undergoing profound changes in their age structure with a high rate of growth of older populations. This phenomenon can be explained by the speed and scale of the demographic transition (lower fecundity, decline in mortality, increase in life expectancy) which under way.

There remains a strong contrast between the northern shore with an aged population and the Southern shore with a population that is still young. Whether in 1990, today or 2020, there will always be a gap some fifteen years higher in the North of the Mediterranean, a not inconsiderable time. At the extremes will be Italy, which will be the oldest country in the region (some 49 years average age in 2020 compared with an average of 34.5 years for the Mediterranean as a whole) and the Palestinian Territories, which are likely to retain the youngest population (average of 20 years in 2020).



## The proportion of youth is gradually eroding

The proportion of Mediterranean youth is still considerable in numerical terms. It is estimated today that 35% of the population of the Basin is aged under 20 years. This ratio rises to 43% on the southern shore, with peaks of over 50% in Palestine, Syria or Jordan, but only 25% in the North. By 2020, over one third of inhabitants living in the South will still be aged under 20 years (Map 5).

With the general ageing of populations, the relative proportion of youth in the population, however, is gradually declining. It will fall between 1990 and 2020 from 30% to 21% on the northern shore and from 52% to 36% on the southern.<sup>8</sup> The “dejuvenalisation” of the South is matched by the “gerontogrowth” of the countries of the North. The contrast by 2020 can be striking between a country like Egypt where 40% of the population will still be under 20 years old and a country like Italy where half the population will be over 50.

<sup>8</sup> - The fall is even more spectacular in the Maghreb, since the proportion of under-20s in the population falls from 52% to 33% between 1990 and 2020. Tunisia has the most surprising figures: the under-20s were 48.5% in 1990, 36.5% in 2005 and according to projections, will be 28% in 2020.



**Map 5 - Age of the population, 2005**

Source: Our calculations based on United Nations  
(World Population Prospects 2004, *medium hypothesis*).

in particular the resurgence of identity as an issue and the growing success of religious political parties. They attest to the divorce from the governing elites and constitute strategic dynamics to be included in the prospective analysis of the socio-demographic context of the region.

The South of the Mediterranean, whose priorities are the Millennium Goals, must face other development challenges (poverty, hunger, gender equality or sustainable development). A specific manifestation of poverty, the problem of under-nutrition, less persistent than in South Asia or sub-Saharan Africa, is still significant. The gap between demographic growth and under-performing agricultural productivity, added to the chronic economic upheavals, inevitably leads to an increase in the number of under-nourished (cf. Annex 4): 9.2 million people (3.9% of the population of the zone) compared with 7.3 million people in 1990 (3.8% of the population). Like other regions of the world, the South of the Mediterranean will probably not reach the goals set by 2015.<sup>9</sup>

These demographic dynamics in the Mediterranean area are naturally accompanied by the emergence of new trends, such as the rise in celibacy among young people, the delay in the age of marriage or new life styles of the elderly whose expectations and needs are very different from those of preceding generations.

In the South, these demographic changes in a very short space of time have a considerable impact on societies, which in turn evolve very rapidly with, for example, the re-balancing of roles in the household (linked to the development of female work) and within families (progressive weakening of patriarchal authority over increasingly well educated children and now urbanised socio-cultural benchmarks). The progressive arabisation of education, the reaffirmation of the pre-eminent role of Islam in daily life and an international context which stigmatises the Arab world are also signals that should not be ignored. Even if these populations are opening up to the world (foreign travel, internet, satellite), they play little part in globalisation. This marginalisation can encourage tensions in these countries,

9 - The Millennium Goals for development number eight: the eradication of extreme poverty and hunger, primary education for all, promotion of gender equality and empowerment of women, reduction of child mortality, improvement in maternal health, combating HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases, ensuring environmental sustainability and developing a global partnership for development (United Nations General Assembly, 2000).

## The outlook for the Mediterranean

The strong trends and uncertainties analysed above seem to suggest seven major challenges to the Mediterranean socio-demographic sphere. Already a perceptible problem, these challenges are likely to be further evident in the years ahead, heralding both challenges to be met and the risks of breakdown to be envisaged.

### Women in the Mediterranean

The status of women in the Mediterranean countries, where the patriarchal order is still firmly entrenched and remains a topical issue. Of course, more and more Mediterranean women are working, empowering themselves in society or attending university. Access to education has probably been the chief revolution for women in the region. Moreover, they are increasingly entering the circles of power. Militant associations have undoubtedly contributed to recognition of their rights.

Several countries have adopted important reforms of their Family Codes. Worth mentioning are the example of the Moudawana in Morocco in 2003 and the Code of Personal Status in Tunisia, promulgated in 1956, which is still the most revolutionary text on women's rights in the Arab world thanks to its amendment in the early 1990s. Reforms have also taken place in Algeria and Syria. However, as recently underlined by a recent report, "The changes of laws are only one – but important step – in working towards equality. It needs to be followed by awareness raising of the changes and by ensuring implementation of the laws" (Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network, 2006).

Nevertheless, these efforts do not yet allow men and women to be regarded as being truly on an equal footing in legal, economic or social terms. The situation of women is still more difficult than men's when it comes to jobs, wages and rights. Their independence is subject to restrictions in the majority of countries and, what is more, huge disparities in the status and conditions of women can be seen between women living in the large towns and those in rural environments (the changes in terms of attitudes and family organisations occur first in the towns). This imbalance between the two sexes is the result of a combination of historical, socio-economic, political and cultural factors. All these findings are not specific to the countries of the southern shore. They apply equally to the North Mediterranean States (Spain and Italy especially), even if gender inequalities there are less pronounced.

Women are still under-represented in national parliaments<sup>10</sup> (Eurosmesco, 2006) in the South Mediterranean countries (4.5% of elected members in Turkey, 5.3% in Algeria, 4.3% in Egypt, 15% in Israel, 7.9% in Jordan, 12% in Syria, 11.9% in Morocco and 22.8% in Tunisia), and also in Europe (14% in Greece, 30.5% in Spain, 13.9% in France, 10.4% in Italy and 20% in Portugal). On the southern shore, polygamy, although banned in some countries, is still common, as is the practice of forced marriages. Very often, the wife only inherits part of the assets in the case of widowhood while divorce proceedings are still generally very difficult. Illiteracy affects more women than men (62% of adult women compared with 39% of adult men in Morocco in 2003), and two thirds

10 - National parliaments were examined over the period 2003-05.

of adult women in the Mediterranean Arab countries do not work, although they represent over 30% of the total active work force of those countries.

They are essentially active in the agricultural sector, manufacturing industry (textiles-clothing), services or public administration. Parallel to the feminisation of work, particularly rapid in recent years, a feminisation of poverty can also be observed in the southern shore of the Mediterranean: in periods of crisis or adjustment, the rate of women's unemployment rises faster than that of men, for they are more vulnerable to contractions in the job supply (Roques, 2006). The development of local financial instruments such as micro credit can sometimes alleviate these difficulties, especially in working class districts where women, the primary beneficiaries, are able to redefine their role in the family and the immediate social environment.

Gender discrimination is even more pronounced in the rural world than in the towns. As underlined by several international reports (Radwan and Reiffers, 2006), the fragility of the economic and social conditions of women in the countryside of the South Mediterranean is amplified by the poverty that prevails there. While the environment of men in rural areas is above all outside, thus generating income and social recognition of the family, the woman's world is generally restricted to daily family life (in the home and working of the neighbouring farm). Even today, a girl in the countryside of the South will be less well cared for, less well fed and less well educated than her brother.

The share of agriculture in total women's employment is evaluated at 22% in Algeria, 39% in Egypt, 57% in Morocco and Turkey and 58% in Syria. Another equally telling figure is that in Egypt 200,000 girls aged under 14 years work and in over 80% of cases, this work is in the agricultural sector (fields and farms essentially).

As can be seen, improving the status of women remains a priority challenge for the Mediterranean,<sup>11</sup> with a dual objective: greater integration in economic life and continued promotion of their rights in the civil, political and social fields. Over and beyond the different situations in the countries of the North and the South, most of all there is an asymmetry between the two shores. In the North, women are no longer excluded from the public domain, even if they are still victims of various types of discrimination (such as greater exposure to unemployment and precariousness). On the other hand, in the countries of the South, exclusion is the prime form of domination of women (Audibert and Khodja, 1998), maintained both by the insufficiently reformed legal framework and local customs.

## From neglect of the countryside to the urban explosion: the dual territorial risk

In the North of the Basin, the last decades have been marked by the progressive convergence of the level and quality of life in the towns and the countryside. The socio-demographic and economic changes in the rural world have been to some extent taken

11 - For the first time since the launch of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership in 1995, a ministerial meeting on women was held in Istanbul on 14 and 15 November 2006. UNDP also made it the central theme of its fourth *Arab Human Development Report*, published in December 2006. This report, which examines the situation of women in the Arab-Islamic region deals in particular with their health, level of education and participation in political life.

into account by political strategies. The modernisation of the countryside was driven by European Community policies (Common Agricultural Policy, structural funds, regional actions) or by national policies of States anxious to develop their territory.

In the South, there are still major inequalities between urban (mostly coastal) and rural areas. Progress has been made, it is true, thanks to the actions of governments and public development aid provided by international donors, especially in the period 1970-1980. The lagging of the development of the countryside behind the towns was undoubtedly less in the last third of the 20th century. However, at present, the gaps are still considerable and the gulf could even widen in some cases. The country areas in the South of the Mediterranean are still characterised by poverty, under-employment and lack of access to communal facilities. Links with towns are often inadequate and the urban-rural relationship appears to be growing more complex with the globalisation of the economy and societies. While towns are increasingly facing out towards the outside world and trade, rural areas in these countries with a fragile and fragmented geographical balance remain landlocked and under-developed.

To illustrate this trend in a nutshell, three significant divides can be noted (WHO, 2006 and World Bank, 2006). The first concerns access to drinking water. In 2002, in the majority of countries, rural dwellers had more limited access than city dwellers (only 56% of rural dwellers in Morocco, for example). The second concerns access to health services. Here too, in 2002, it was better to live in the town than in the country (only half the people living in the country in Egypt have access to health services, some 62% in Turkey and 31% in Morocco). Lastly, there is less poverty in the towns than in the country. Estimates of the proportion of the rural population living on less than one dollar a day in 2000 were 23% in Egypt, 18% in Jordan, 34% in Turkey, 27% in Morocco and 14% in Tunisia. These figures should probably be seen as relative, given the extent to which the informal economy remains crucial to the functioning of Mediterranean societies. Indeed the grey economy conceals often imperceptible realities.

These geographical development divides do not seem to have diminished in recent years. In some areas, countries are showing positive results in the development of the countryside (Tunisia, Turkey), but others are experiencing difficulty in equipping and modernising rural areas where the population is not declining. However, gaps in development between town and country can still be seen everywhere or almost everywhere. Is this a case of a new impoverishment of rural areas as seems to be suggested by the poverty indicators of the 1990s? Should one take the cynical view that it is better to be poor on the periphery of a major coastal city than in a faraway village in the interior? These questions alert us to the importance of developing rural areas, albeit allowing for certain interactions. It is a matter of striking a balance between demographic growth, the growing fragility of natural resources and the needs for modernisation in terms of communal facilities.

This second territorial challenge concerning the future of the Mediterranean socio-demographic context concerns the question of geographical balance in the countries of the South. It means ensuring the convergence of territories in order to obviate the amplification of development gaps between the urban and rural worlds. There are two dangerous trends lying in wait for these countries under the effect of the current socio-demographic dynamics:

- The first is the unstoppable expansion of towns with all its corollaries: over-population, uncontrolled urban sprawl cutting off agricultural land, destruction of the coasts, growth of unregulated spontaneous housing, development of squalid marginal districts, environmental pollution, land speculation, unplanned urbanism, rising crime, inadequate or inappropriate infrastructure. Towns must also take responsibility for the rise in unemployment among young graduates and the geographical inequalities that are occurring. At the same time, urban populations, plugged in to the outside world thanks to satellite, trade or tourism, have adopted new patterns of behaviour imitating Western lifestyles. Pressures, tensions and fragmentation of the urban environment engender the risk of Mediterranean “monstropolises” (Troin, 2006) in an already abused natural environment.
- The second danger echoes the first: the new impoverishment of rural areas, victims of under-development, economic stagnation, human exodus and environmental degradation. Lacking dynamism, these remote areas could be further marginalised if the towns, conversely, are swallowed up by globalisation and the market economy. These two contrasting trends could accentuate the marginalisation of the countryside.

The South Mediterranean is thus confronted with a dual geographical risk: uncontrolled growth of the towns, on the one hand, and, on the other, a proliferation of land-locked areas. A final breach of the link between the urban and rural world would be a new handicap for these societies. Apart from geographical balance, there is the question of non-development of the rural interior which is a serious risk.

## Literacy and education: causes and vectors of development

The region has seen a rapid rise in literacy rates thanks to the increase in public spending on education, far higher than in other developing regions.<sup>12</sup> If one looks at the progress from 1993 to 2003, the results are incontrovertible: the number of illiterate adults aged over 15 years fell from 47 to 30% in Algeria, from 53 to 29% in Egypt, from 18 to 10% in Jordan, and likewise from 41 to 26% in Tunisia and from 22 to 13% in Turkey (UNESCO, 2005).

This progress should not blind us to the scale of the phenomenon. Even today, between one quarter and one third of the adult population of these countries cannot read or write. In Morocco, the rate is still exceptionally high, with some 48% of illiterates (albeit compared with 61% in 1990). These results do not take account of the quality of the education which is all too often irrelevant to the tight local labour market. Neither does it lead to increased admission to employment among the ever-growing number of graduates.

The rapid growth in adults in the South Mediterranean countries means that the figures expressed as percentages need to be qualified. In absolute terms, the number of illiterates among the population does not appear to have diminished.<sup>13</sup> This progress is all the more relative in that, once again, worrying signs seem to be emerging concerning

12 - Thus between 1970 and 2000, the Arab Mediterranean countries devoted an average of 5.3% of GDP annually to education, compared with 2.8% in East Asia, 3.3% in Latin America and 2.4% in South Asia (Ould Aoudia 2006).

13 - Taking the case of Algeria, for example, 47% of illiterates in the adult population in 1990 represents some 7 million individuals. In 2003, the rate had fallen to 30% which represents between 7 and 8 million people based on the estimated population at that date. This type of calculation can be repeated for the other South Mediterranean countries.

the current ability of young school children to read and write as well as their elders. The decline in illiteracy could level off further in the coming years rather than continuing its progressive downward path.

## Demographic change transforms societies: the inter-generation challenge

The third strategic challenge concerns demographic change. In the European countries of the northern shore, the equation to be solved is known: how to sustain the welfare state system when the number of pensioners is rising and the number of those of working age is falling. Pensions funding is no longer guaranteed in the medium term in these countries where at times the only demographic growth is the result of the balance of migration (Spain and Italy in particular).

In the South of the Basin, the same problem could arise, albeit with a time lag, if current demographic trends continue. But the urgency lies elsewhere. Based on raw figures, population experts think that the southern Mediterranean countries are now in a demographic windfall phase, with considerable human resources of working age and a relatively low inactive population (young children and the elderly). However, this demographic manna is nothing of the sort in countries which lack an institutional environment capable of mobilising this human capital effectively. The number of unemployed graduates is rising in families where parents keep their children under their roof later and later. So long as these parents work (i.e. the current 40-60 age group in particular), the economic and demographic shock is damped. This will no longer be true, however, if income runs out or the children's economic inactivity is prolonged in a system where there is no proper social security system. Whence, perhaps, the new demographic behaviour of couples who must plan and space births to maximise the chances of sending one or more children into higher education. The economic problem is thus increasingly reflected in demographic practices. The growing complexity of the economic and demographic environment is turning Mediterranean societies upside down: although the inter-generation bond is sometimes strengthened (importance of the family, responsibility of parents and children), unfortunately it is also mortgaged (how long can this vulnerable situation be maintained?).

## Hopes and despair of Mediterranean youth

What does the future hold for young Mediterraneans? Unemployment, precariousness and malaise affect the youth of the countries of the northern shore just as much as those of the southern, even if the circumstances vary. Tensions in the labour market are especially felt by urban youth and graduates. In the South, with strong demographic growth of recent years, the population of working age has shown a marked increase. However, the economic tempo is not keeping up with the pace of the demography. Barring a miracle, it will probably be the same in the future given that, in spite of everything, the current growth is vulnerable.

---

14 - Our calculations are based on statistical data provided by the United Nations and the French National Institute for Demographic Studies, presented in the work of the economist Jacques Ould Aoudia (2006). Labour market tension in

The number of net entries into the labour market in the Arab Mediterranean countries between 1995 and 2025 can be estimated at between 80 and 85 million, with some 45 million for the period 2005-2020,<sup>14</sup> i.e. an average of 3 million entries annually over these fifteen years. These figures show the huge number of jobs that would have to be created in these countries already subject to high unemployment.

Faced with this problem, two responses seem to have predominated for some years: emigration, either with the opportunity to go abroad in acceptable conditions (e.g. the brain drain to North America in particular and less to Europe), or the temptation to clandestine exile, and the development of informal activity which puts a brake on national development but allows people to live (this phenomenon also occurs in Italy) or quite simply to survive. This underground economy reflects an adaptation strategy necessary in societies marked by a governance deficit.

The rise in the average marriage age is linked to these socio-economic problems, especially in the Maghreb and particularly for men (thus in Tunisia, it was 19.5 years for women and 26.3 years for men in 1996 against 26.6 years and 32.3 years respectively in 2000). Fecundity in the Arab-Muslim countries is largely conditioned by marriage, and the decline in births is also due to this increasingly delayed union. The hypothesis of an increase in celibacy at all ages may also be proposed in these societies where unemployment, precariousness and powerful demographic changes due to urbanisation, extension of education and progressive feminisation of labour are superimposed.

There is an urgent need to create jobs, but also to purge development of a sense of frustration and despair in the minds of parents who have often invested heavily in the education of their children. This social malaise, moreover, is set in a context already marked by public disaffection with the governing elites and growing economic problems. It is undoubtedly in part on the back of this desperation that political and religious extremists prosper. The centre of social activism, moreover, is increasingly occupied by moderate Islamic organisations which in return benefit from a deep gratitude and thus a growing electoral following.

## Migration

Migration, mostly South-North, can be seen daily across the Mediterranean Basin, and has been so for a very long time. Of all demographic problems, immigration is the one which very often attracts the attention of public opinion and the media. Yet international migration is of little weight compared with a country's fecundity and mortality. An English population expert has estimated the net inflow of migrants into the current members of the European Union from 1955 to 2005 at between 10 and 15 million. Over the same period, there were some 300 million births in the same countries. Of course, the period studied is that of the population boom in Europe and migration gradually increased over the last third of the 20th century. However, as the same expert recalls, the total number of births in the European Union is still four times higher than the number of immigrants each year (Wilson, 2005).

International and Mediterranean migration will probably not decline but the volumes will still not be enough to disturb fundamentally the demographic structure of the

---

the Arab Mediterranean countries will peak between 2000 and 2010, while the decline in net entries is likely to begin around 2015.



North Mediterranean countries in the period to 2020. This does not mean, however, that the emotional and social impact of migration in the European countries will be negligible, quite the contrary. It can be seen from several perspectives:

- The first perspective is that of the European, who observes that the migrant question has become a priority in political debate and that clandestine immigration is on the rise, reflected in the *boat people* who regularly wash up on the coasts of Italy and Spain.
- The second perspective is that of the southern Mediterranean, emphasising that the hope of being able to migrate is born primarily from despair at not being able to stay at home. Many are migrants who have already travelled the road from country to town. Going abroad, in sometimes dramatic circumstances, is not a relief but first and foremost yet another sacrifice to be endured. Exile is always or almost always dictated by financial constraints, lack of freedom, insecurity or extreme poverty. Migration from the South to the North of the Mediterranean can be explained by other factors: the image of social success displayed by some immigrants returning to the country during the summer holidays or the impact of the audiovisual via satellite and Internet which daily transport them in spirit to a near and comforting other world.
- The last perspective is that of the analyst who must emphasise three dimensions. First, he will recall the decisive role in migration of economic, demographic and political disparities between the countries of origin in the South and the host countries in the North. Treating the question solely as a security matter will lead nowhere. It is primarily a challenge of development. Then there is the socio-economic role of this migration for populations in the South. Since 1990, total financial transfers by immigrants has been greater than government development aid or foreign direct investment in these South-Mediterranean countries. These transfers, most of which come from Europe, for example, represented between 6 and 9% of Moroccan GDP over the period 1998-2003 (EIB, 2006). By supporting families who stay behind in the country of origin, these transfers act as social safety nets alleviating the difficulties of everyday life, especially in rural areas. Lastly, the analyst will emphasise that profound changes have occurred or are occurring. While in the past Italy and Spain were countries of emigration, since the 1990s, they have become hosts. Another emerging phenomenon is that certain countries of the southern shore, Morocco and Libya in particular, have gradually been changing into transit zones for migrants from sub-Saharan Africa. This pressure from outside the Mediterranean accentuates the migration phenomenon at the southern gates of the Mediterranean Basin. The Maghreb is in an unprecedented geopolitical situation as both a zone of emigration to Europe and a zone of immigration for the trans-Saharan flows.<sup>15</sup> Another new case is that of the Near-East States which have had to accommodate Iraqi refugees since the outbreak of the conflict in 2003: Syria (from 1.2 to 1.5 million), Jordan (from 500,000 to 750,000), and also Egypt (over 80,000) and Lebanon (some 20,000).<sup>16</sup>

15 - An international symposium was organised on this subject from 2 to 4 November in Marseille by the Institute for Arab and Islamic Studies and Research (IREMAM), with the title *Immigration, transit and retention: the Maghreb put to the test by the trans-Saharan traffic*.

16 - These figures are taken from Resolution P6\_TA (2007) 0357, adopted on 12 July 2007 in Strasbourg by the European Parliament concerning the humanitarian situation of Iraqi refugees.

The on-going demographic growth and the lack of prospects in local markets suggest that migratory pressures will continue from now until 2020, even if European States tighten their border controls and policies. Specific European demand for jobs now regarded as socially undesirable because they are precarious and arduous could become ever more manifest, creating a need for skilled and targeted immigration (for example in construction and personal services) or alternatively giving rise to recourse to clandestine labour (in the agricultural sector, especially in southern and eastern Europe).

For the people of Europe and the Mediterranean, these migrations also raise the question of living together in a Europe where cultures could merge rather than collide with each other, despite a regional and media environment which might suggest the opposite. Cultural cross-fertilisation, the first signs of which can already be seen, could become increasingly decisive for every European society. Those who reject it are likely to be hung up on identity and thus to advocate turning inwards. Those who make a strategic decision to stake their development model on it could find that it gives them a comparative advantage in a world where multiculturalism will probably carry more weight than an amalgamation of similarities.

In conclusion, one figure should be mentioned: in 2004, the twenty-five member European Union had some 5.8 million foreigners from the South Mediterranean countries (i.e. some 20% of foreigners resident on European soil and 1.3% of the population of the Union) (Fargues, 2005).<sup>17</sup> That should not, however, conceal the importance of South Mediterranean emigration to non-European destinations, namely the Gulf States and especially North America (United States and Canada) which take in a considerable number of skilled migrants.

## **Birth of a hidden Mediterranean social divide**

A sixth and last challenge seems to be emerging, a hidden social divide. Just as territories split into areas connected to the outside world and landlocked areas, Mediterranean societies seemed to be splitting into categories of globalised populations and marginalised categories. While this divide can be found in many regions of the world, it is particularly prevalent in the Mediterranean. This trend stems from the current forms of globalisation, essentially inspired by a liberal dogma underlying widening social inequalities within each national territory.

The globalised Mediterraneans are fewer in number. They have stable families, jobs and weave strong personal relationships. They travel and are enriched by meetings with others. They have the financial and intellectual means to follow the dynamics and changes brought by globalisation. They are not necessarily the wealthiest or best placed in the professional hierarchy, even if there is often a close correlation. Rather, they are modern elites, mastering technological and communication tools, constantly keeping up to date with everything, and able to access the various forums of expression (political, purchasing power, speaking, commitments, militant action). This last is a growing strategic comparative advantage. They are proactive in the face of social change. Confident and

---

17 - Note that the proportion of South Mediterranean migrants among the total number of foreigners present exceeds the approximate Community average (20% in the period 2002-04) in France (42%, some 2 million South Mediterraneans), in Germany (29.2%, 2.15 million) and in Italy (20.9%, 360,000 people).

masters of their own destiny, these globalised Mediterraneans are the real architects of their own future. Their world is both polycentric (network, multi-task) and “glocalised” (participation in globalisation and intensive involvement in local social life).

The marginalised Mediterraneans, on the other hand, are detached from globalisation. They are not cut off from it, but rather spectators or victims. They live globalisation at a distance (Internet and satellite are only ways of relieving boredom or windows on the world) or suffer its negative effects (precariousness, impoverishment, inflation). The recent acceleration of history and the upheavals induced by the market economy have left them behind. These populations are cut off from decision-making circles or centers of socialisation. They tend to turn inwards on themselves, their neighbours or their beliefs. Their world functions in a sealed jar. Faced with this sense of unfairness and a globalisation which leaves them behind, the marginalised Mediterraneans say nothing (physical or intellectual incapacity), give up saying anything (depoliticisation, individualism, loss of reference points) or, conversely, shout loudly (rise of political and religious radicalism, revolts in the suburbs of large urban centres). Women make up the majority of this category, especially because a situation of subservience to men persists in the Mediterranean.

This Mediterranean social divide is still barely perceptible, but it cannot conceal the main asymmetries which separate the northern shore from the southern (wealth and development). It could gradually emerge and impact on the future socio-demographic environment of the Mediterranean.

## Probable socio-demographic trends

Among the principal dominant trends and major uncertainties concerning the demographic context of the Mediterranean, several trends are likely to continue or intensify up to 2020:

- Population growth in the countries of the southern Mediterranean shore, although less rapid than at the end of the 20th century.
- In the North of the Basin, the majority of States could see a demographic crisis related to the decline in fecundity rates and especially the numerical growth in the number of elderly in their societies. Only France is today experiencing a natural demographic resurgence with a rising fecundity rate.
- The urbanisation of Mediterranean societies will continue, albeit more rapidly on the southern shore. This process will be accompanied by increasing resettlement of these urban and peri-urban populations along the coast. The number of large cities in the Mediterranean is likely to increase further, while landlocked and neglected rural areas could multiply in the interiors of southern shore State.
- In some countries, the countryside may not suffer massive depopulation. Between now and 2020, rural dwellers will probably still be more numerous in Egypt, Jordan, Syria and the Palestinian Territories. The rural nature of the population of the Mediterranean region is thus not likely to disappear over the next fifteen years, even though its size is gradually being eroded in the North of the Basin and declining in the Maghreb and Turkey.

- The demographic change in the countries of the southern shore will continue and even accelerate in the Maghreb zone. People there will have fewer children, live longer and mortality rates will continue to decrease. This phenomenon can be explained by the spread of modern medicine and health systems, growing use of contraception and family planning.
- Ageing of the population in the Mediterranean region will probably intensify, especially in the countries of the southern shore and more particularly in the Maghreb and Turkey, where the average age continues to rise, despite the still youthful character of the population, compared with European societies, like Italy or Greece, increasingly composed of old people. If in numerical terms, it does not diminish over the next fifteen years, the number of young persons under the age of 20 is crumbling substantially in relative terms in all the countries of the southern shore of the Mediterranean.

The major uncertainties of the Mediterranean demographic context up to 2020 rather concern the socio-economic aspects and impacts of the demographic trends described above. The question is how can Mediterraneans societies be managed and organised when they are generally increasingly urban, coastal, educated and ageing?

In the North, the chief uncertainties concern the chances of being able to perpetuate social and pensions systems *ad aeternam* without major reforms. The majority of European countries will be faced with a diminution of assets and an increase in the non-working population, in an economic climate probably characterised by weak growth and high unemployment. Precarious or informal employment could at the same time increase in the northern Mediterranean countries, where individuals, both the forsaken and immigrants, will need to combine several activities or hold thankless jobs simply to live.

In the South Mediterranean, the challenges are of a different nature. In increasingly urbanised States, where women are gradually gaining their independence, social and religious customs could change. Lifestyles are also becoming increasingly individual in countries where celibacy is on the rise, the number of births is drying up and bonds are coming untied. In addition, a dangerous mismatch is being created between an educated population of working age and an adverse or sclerotic labour market. The numerical growth in the number of jobless and unemployed graduates is turning the South-Mediterranean countries into very real socio-economic powder kegs, finding expression now and doubtless in the future in migration on the one hand and radicalisation (political and religious) on the other. Finally, the questions of governance and the development model in these countries, where indicators of living standards, education and health seem to have stopped improving in the face of current and accelerating socio-economic change, should not be overlooked.

The demographic changes at work in the Mediterranean coupled with the development dynamics thus provide a complex and somewhat disturbed panorama for the future of the region in the years ahead. The Mediterranean will be more urban and older. Populations will be bigger on the southern shore in countries where the countryside, while still well populated, is at risk of marginalisation. Mal-development may continue to characterise the situation of several Mediterranean countries. Environmental degradation and the scale of the socio-economic challenges will unfortunately further cloud the horizon.

This analysis of the dynamics of the socio-demographic context in the Mediterranean, the effects of which on forms of consumption, work or government agricultural policies can be foreseen, will be highlighted by the examination of the major challenges ahead for the region's agriculture.

## Bibliography

Ait-Zal (N.), "Les réformes de la loi familiale au Maghreb", in *Med.2005. Annuaire de la Méditerranée*, Barcelona, IEMED, 2005.

Allaya (M.) (dir.), *MedAgri 2006. Annuaire des économies agricoles et alimentaires des pays méditerranéens et arabes*, Montpellier, MAI, 2006.

Aubarell (G.) and Aragall (X.), "Immigration and the Euro-Mediterranean Area", *Euromesco paper 47*, Lisbon, September 2005.

Azéma (C.) (dir.), *Les Droits des femmes dans le partenariat euro-méditerranéen*, report to the French Economic and Social Council, Paris, December 2005.

Benoit (G.) and Comeau (A.) (ed.), *Méditerranée. Les perspectives du Plan bleu sur l'environnement et le développement*, La Tour d'Aigues, Éditions de l'Aube, 2005.

Bensaad (A.), Mazzella (S.), Wihtol de Wenden (C.) and Wilson (Ch.), "Les défis migratoires et démographiques", in Sant Cassia (P.) and Fabre (Th.) (ed.), *Les Défis et les peurs entre Europe et Méditerranée*, Arles, Actes Sud, 2005, p. 19-101.

Chasteland (J.-C.) and Chesnaïs (J.-C.), "La grande transformation démographique du XXI<sup>e</sup> siècle", in Chasteland (J.-C.) and Chesnaïs (J.-C.) (ed.), *La Population du Monde*, Paris, INED, 2003.

Courbage (Y.), *Nouveaux horizons démographiques en Méditerranée*, Paris, PUF/INED, 1999.

Dore-Audibert (A.) and Khodja (S.), *Être femme au Maghreb et en Méditerranée. Du mythe à la réalité*, Paris, Karthala 1998.

Durand (M.-F.), Martin (B.), Placidi (D.) and Törnquist-Chenier (M.), *Atlas de la mondialisation*, Paris, Presses de Sciences Po, 2006.

EIB, *Study on Improving the Efficiency of Workers' Remittances in Mediterranean Countries*, FEMIP report, Luxembourg, 2006.

Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network (EMHRN), *Achieving Gender Equality in the Euro-Mediterranean Region: change is possible and necessary*, Copenhagen, October 2006.

Euromesco, *Women as full participants in the Euro-Mediterranean Community of Democratic States*, Euromesco Report, Lisbon, April 2006.

Fargues (Ph.) (dir.), *Migrations méditerranéennes: rapport annuel 2005*, CARIM report, Florence, Robert Schuman Centre and European University Institute, Florence, October 2005.

FAO, *The World Food and Agriculture Situation 2005*, Rome, 2005a.

FAO, *The State of Food Insecurity in the World*, Rome, 2005b.

Femise, *Impact de la libéralisation agricole dans le contexte du partenariat euro-méditerranéen*, collective report, Marseille, November 2003.

- Griffon (M.), *Nourrir la planète*, Paris, Odile Jacob, 2006.
- Hervieu (B.) (dir.), *Agri. Med 2005. Agriculture, fishery, food and sustainable development in the Mediterranean region*, Ciheam Annual Report, Paris, Ciheam, 2005.
- Hervieu (B.) et Abis (S.), "Agriculture, développement rural et mondialisation en Méditerranée", *Politica Agricola Internazionale*, 4, 2005, Vérone, L'Informatore Agrario/Ismea, December 2005.
- Lipchitz (A.), "La libéralisation agricole en zone euro-méditerranéenne: la nécessité d'une approche progressive", *Notes et études économiques*, 23, Paris, Minsitry of Agriculture and Fisheries, September 2005.
- OECD and FAO, *Agricultural Outlook 2006-2015*, Paris, 2006.
- Ould Aoudia (J.), "Croissance et réformes dans les pays arabes méditerranéens", *Notes et documents*, 28, Paris, French Development Agency, July 2006.
- Radwan (S.) and Reiffers (J.-L.), *Rapport 2005 sur le Partenariat euro-méditerranéen*, Marseille, FEMISE, February 2006.
- Radwan (S.) and Reiffers (J.-L.), *Les Femmes et le développement économique en Méditerranée*, Marseille, FEMISE, April 2006.
- Roques (M.-A.), "Women in the Mediterranean Mirror", *Quaderns de la Mediterranià*, 7, Barcelona, IEMED, October 2006.
- Troin (J.-F.), *Le Grand Maghreb*, Paris, Armand Colin, 2006.
- UNEP, *Mediterranean Action Plan. Mediterranean strategy for sustainable development: a framework for environmental sustainability and shared prosperity*, adopted by the United Nations 27 June 2005.
- UNDP, *Human Development Report 2005*, New York (N. Y.), 2005.
- UNDP, *Arab Human Development Report 2005*, New York (N. Y.), 2007.
- UNESCO, *Statistics on the education in the Arab countries*, 2005.
- United Nations General Assembly, *Millennium Declaration*, Resolution A/RES/55/2, New York (N. Y.), 13 September 2000.
- United Nations, *World Population Prospects: The 2004 Revision Population Database*, New York (N. Y.), 2005.
- Wilson (Ch.), "Transitions démographiques en Europe et dans le Bassin méditerranéen", in Sant Cassia (P.) and Fabre (Th.) (ed.), *Les Défis et les peurs entre Europe et Méditerranée*, Arles, Actes Sud, 2005, p. 21-48.
- WHO, *The World Health Report 2006*, Geneva, 2006.
- World Bank, "Poverty in the Middle East and North Africa", Sectoral Note, Washington (D. C.), August 2005a.
- World Bank, "Urban Development in the Middle East and North Africa", Sectoral Note, Washington (D. C.), August 2005b.
- World Bank, *World Development Indicators 2006*, Washington (D. C.), World Bank Publications, 2006.

## Annexes

### Annex 1 - Fecundity index in the Mediterranean

Country	1990-1995	1995-2000	2000-2005	2005-2010	2010-2015	2015-2020
Albania	2.78	2.43	2.29	2.18	2.09	2.01
Cyprus	2.36	1.92	1.63	1.6	1.6	1.64
Spain	1.27	1.18	1.27	1.35	1.42	1.49
France	1.71	1.76	1.87	1.85	1.85	1.85
Greece	1.37	1.3	1.25	1.25	1.29	1.36
Italy	1.28	1.21	1.28	1.38	1.41	1.45
Malta	2.02	1.85	1.5	1.5	1.53	1.6
Portugal	1.52	1.48	1.47	1.47	1.5	1.57
Algeria	4.13	2.88	2.53	2.39	2.27	2.17
Egypt	3.91	3.53	3.29	2.99	2.75	2.57
Israel	2.93	2.94	2.85	2.66	2.49	2.36
Jordan	5.14	4.32	3.53	3.13	2.81	2.54
Lebanon	3	2.7	2.32	2.21	2.12	2.03
Libya	4.1	3.41	3.03	2.72	2.47	2.26
Morocco	3.66	3	2.76	2.58	2.43	2.3
Syria	4.61	3.95	3.47	3.08	2.76	2.51
Tunisia	3.13	2.32	2	1.87	1.73	1.7
Turkey	2.9	2.69	2.46	2.31	2.21	2.11
Palestinian Authority	6.46	5.99	5.57	5	4.4	3.85
<b>Mediterranean</b>	<b>3.07</b>	<b>2.68</b>	<b>2.44</b>	<b>2.29</b>	<b>2.16</b>	<b>2.07</b>
SEMC	4.00	3.43	3.07	2.81	2.59	2.40
European Mediterranean	1.65	1.47	1.47	1.49	1.51	1.57
World	3.04	2.79	2.65	2.55	2.46	2.38

Source: Our calculations based on United Nations (World Population Prospects 2004, mean hypothesis).

Composition of categories:

- SEMC: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey and the Palestinian Authority.
- European Mediterranean: Cyprus, France, Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal and Spain.



## **Annex 2 - The Human Development Index (HDI) shows deep disparities between the Mediterranean countries**


However debatable it may be, a composite indicator now measures the state of development of societies as a whole. This is the Human Development Indicator (HDI) suggested each year by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The HDI measures three dimensions of human well-being: average wealth (GDP per capita in purchasing power parity (PPP), life expectancy at birth (longevity and health) and level of education (literacy and knowledge). The HDI value ranges from 0 to 1. The maximum value corresponds to an excellent rating and the minimum is extremely poor. Countries ranked between 0.8 and 1 are considered the most favoured. Countries whose HDI is less than 0.5, on the other hand, are considered to be in a state of weak development.

It is true that the indicator is not perfect, since it does not take sufficient account of the disparities within the same country. Nevertheless, the HDI is an interesting barometer since it is unique of its kind, and provides an annual snapshot of the level of development of each country in the world and thus the ability to cross-reference the data regionally and observe gaps within a given geographical area. How does this apply to the Mediterranean region and how has the HDI evolved over the last thirty years? Three rapid observations can be made.

The first is that the HDI has improved in each of the Mediterranean countries since 1975, and more rapidly on the southern shore, especially in the Maghreb States. The second observation flows from the previous: as the HDI has improved in each of the countries, gaps therefore persist between the European States of the northern shore and the Arab countries of the southern shore even if they have been gradually narrowing. Thus in 2004 the average HDI for the former was 0.918 compared with 0.767 for the latter, or an average gap of 0.151. In 1975, however, the gap was 0.328 and in 1990, 0.232. Ranking the Mediterranean countries according to their HDI for 2004, it appears that France is in first place (0.942), Israel on the southern shore makes fourth place (0.927), Libya is the top-ranked Arab country (0.798) and Morocco remains the Mediterranean country with the lowest HDI. The third and last observation emphasises that no Arab country has so far attained the symbolic threshold of 0.8 and that all of them, apart from Libya (64th), are ranked between 78th and 123rd in the world, i.e. in the middle.

In the light of these observations, it could be that the convergence between the North and the South Mediterranean in terms of HDI will continue in the future. The reason that this process will probably continue is that, on the one hand, the European States of the North are now approaching the maximum ceiling of the index while, on the other, those of the South, apart from Israel, are still at the development stage (since the HDI there is below the 0.8 threshold). Lastly, as world HDI is rising more or less everywhere, it is a safe bet that the Arab Mediterranean countries will remain in the middle of the ranking for a long time yet.

### Annex 3 - Human Development Index of the Mediterranean




### Annex 4 - Trends in under-nutrition among South Mediterranean populations

Country	Number of under-nourished persons (millions)		Proportion of under-nourished persons in the total population	
	1990-1992	2001-2003	1990-1992	2001-2003
Algeria	1.3	1.7	5.1%	4.2%
Egypt	2.5	2.4	4.5%	3.6%
Jordan	0.1	0.4	3.1%	8%
Lebanon	0.1	0.1	3.7%	3%
Libya	nc	nc	nc	nc
Morocco	1.5	1.9	6%	6.3%
Syria	0.7	0.6	5.5%	3.6%
Tunisia	0.1	0.1	1.2%	1%
Turkey	1	2	1.7%	2.8%
<b>Total South Mediterranean</b>	<b>7.3</b>	<b>9.2</b>	<b>3.8%</b>	<b>3.9%</b>

Source: Our calculations based on Faostat 2006 and UN 2004.

## Annex 5 - Age pyramid trends in Italy, Tunisia and Egypt





2008

# *Medi*TERRA

THE FUTURE OF AGRICULTURE AND FOOD  
IN MEDITERRANEAN COUNTRIES



SciencesPo.  
Les Presses



CIHEAM

# Table OF CONTENTS

<b>PREFACE</b>	<b>11</b>
----------------	-----------

<b>CONTRIBUTORS</b>	<b>13</b>
---------------------	-----------

<b>ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS</b>	<b>15</b>
-----------------------------------	-----------

<b>INTRODUCTION</b>	<b>21</b>
---------------------	-----------

• Building the future	21
• The geopolitics of the Mediterranean	22
• Forums for Mediterranean Cooperation	28

<b>1 ANALYSIS</b>	
of agriculture and the agro-food situation in the Mediterranean region	31

<b>&gt; CHAPTER 1</b>	
<b>The socio-demographic context</b>	<b>33</b>

• The demographic dynamics in the Mediterranean	34
• The outlook for the Mediterranean	42
• Probable socio-demographic trends	50

<b>&gt; CHAPTER 2</b>	
<b>The geo-economic context</b>	<b>59</b>

• Economic dynamics in the Mediterranean region	60
• The development and place of agriculture in the Mediterranean economy	77

<b>&gt; CHAPTER 3</b>	
<b>Natural resources</b>	<b>99</b>

• Climate disruption in the Mediterranean region	99
• Soil, a much-coveted resource	103
• Blue gold?	107
• Forest land, a threatened heritage	113

- Energy: a new deal 115
- The limits have been reached 117

#### > CHAPTER 4

### Science, technology and innovation 123

- Innovation and changes in agro-food systems 124
- Education and research systems in the agricultural and agro-food sector 130
- ICTs: an aid to convergence or widening the gap? 133
- Biotechnologies in food and agriculture 140
- Pursuing the march of progress together 144

#### > CHAPTER 5

### Dietary patterns and trends in consumption 149

- Food consumption and eating habits in the Mediterranean 149
- Food security ensured but food quality a weaker point 158
- Food quality: a growing challenge 167

#### > CHAPTER 6

### Governance in the rural and agricultural world 171

- Actions by Mediterranean States for agriculture and the rural world 172
- The emergence of local actors in rural governance 181
- The environmental question at the heart of Mediterranean co-operation 184
- The contrasting reality and outlook for the Mediterranean rural world 187

## FROM ANALYSIS

### to action priorities 193

- The socio-demographic context 193
- The geo-economic context 194
- Natural resources 196
- Science, technology and innovation 198
- Dietary patterns and trends in consumption 199
- Governance in the rural and agricultural world 200
- Launching action 201



## 2 ACTION PRIORITIES

### for Mediterranean agriculture and agro-food production in the world of 2020 203

#### > CHAPTER 7

#### Reconciling production and management of scarce resources 205

- On the horns of climatic change and energy shortages 205
- Saving water: a vital challenge 210
- Observing, planning, legislating: three challenges for the protection of Mediterranean soils 221
- The crossroads 223

#### > CHAPTER 8

#### Ensuring food security and food safety 227

- Including ecological and nutritional sustainability in development plans 228
- Reconciling modernisation and tradition in the interplay between actors 230
- Bearing the local market in mind while joining the international market 233
- Devising sectoral policies which include nutrition and health 234
- Several forward-looking scenarios 235
- The avenues to be explored 243
- Food security and food safety are crucial to harmonious development at the local level 244

#### > CHAPTER 9

#### Supply and marketing of agricultural commodities 247

- Organisation of agro-food supply in the Mediterranean region: trends and dynamics 248
- Fundamental challenges and hypotheses: players, levers for action, resources and impediments 260
- Scenarios for quality agro-food supply in the Mediterranean region 269

#### > CHAPTER 10

#### Development strategies for rural areas 275

- The rural population in the Mediterranean in 2020 276

- Four key factors in the evolution of today's societies **284**
- A major challenge: the regional approach to rural development **287**
- Some scenarios for the future of rural spaces **297**

#### **> CHAPTER 11**

### **Strengthening and consolidating education and research capacities **301****

- New competencies and new expertise **303**
- Improving the relationship between education and work **309**
- Constructing a Euro-Mediterranean research area **314**
- Infusing knowledge, promoting innovation **319**
- Possible futures, a desirable future **323**

## **3 GLOBAL SCENARIOS** for Mediterranean agriculture **327**

- The future: an open book **329**
- An overview of future Mediterranean scenarios **331**
- Action is needed now to build the future we want **344**

### **PROPOSALS** for action **345**

- General approaches **345**
- Technical proposals **347**

### **TABLE** OF DOCUMENTS **353**