Büthe T., Mattli W. (2011). The new global rulers: the privatization of regulation in the world economy. Princeton (États-Unis) : Princeton University Press. 301 p.
https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400838790
https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400838790
Titre : | The new global rulers: the privatization of regulation in the world economy |
Auteurs : | T. Büthe ; W. Mattli |
Type de document : | Ouvrage |
Editeur : | Princeton [États-Unis] : Princeton University Press, 2011 |
ISBN/ISSN/EAN : | 978-0-691-14479-5 |
Format : | 301 p. |
Langues : | Anglais |
Langues du résumé : | Anglais |
Catégories : |
Catégories principales 03 - POLITIQUE ET THEORIE ECONOMIQUE ; 3.3 - Politique et Situation EconomiquesThésaurus IAMM SYSTEME ECONOMIQUE ; PRIVATISATION ; ORGANISATION SOCIOECONOMIQUE ; DESENGAGEMENT DE L'ETAT ; ORGANISATION INTERNATIONALE ; MARCHE MONDIAL ; ECONOMIE INTERNATIONALE ; MONDIALISATION ; LEGISLATION ; GOUVERNANCE ; MARCHE FINANCIER INTERNATIONAL |
Résumé : | Over the past two decades, governments have delegated extensive regulatory authority to international private-sector organizations. This internationalization and privatization of rule making has been motivated not only by the economic benefits of common rules for global markets, but also by the realization that government regulators often lack the expertise and resources to deal with increasingly complex and urgent regulatory tasks. The New Global Rulers examines who writes the rules in international private organizations, as well as who wins, who loses--and why. Tim Büthe and Walter Mattli examine three powerful global private regulators: the International Accounting Standards Board, which develops financial reporting rules used by corporations in more than a hundred countries; and the International Organization for Standardization and the International Electrotechnical Commission, which account for 85 percent of all international product standards. Büthe and Mattli offer both a new framework for understanding global private regulation and detailed empirical analyses of such regulation based on multi-country, multi-industry business surveys. They find that global rule making by technical experts is highly political, and that even though rule making has shifted to the international level, domestic institutions remain crucial. Influence in this form of global private governance is not a function of the economic power of states, but of the ability of domestic standard-setters to provide timely information and speak with a single voice. Büthe and Mattli show how domestic institutions' abilities differ, particularly between the two main standardization players, the United States and Europe. |
Note de contenu : |
Chapter One: The Rise of Private Regulation in the World Economy
Chapter Two: Private Nonmarket Rule-Making in Context A Typology of Global Regulation Chapter Three: Institutional Complementarity Theory Chapter Four: Private Regulators in Global Financial Markets Institutional Structure and Complementarity in Accounting Regulation Chapter Five: The Politics of Setting Standards for Financial Reporting Chapter Six: Private Regulators in Global Product Markets Institutional Structure and Complementarity in Product Regulation Chapter Seven: The Politics of Nuts and Bolts- and Nanotechnology ISO and IEC Standard-Setting for Global Product Markets Chapter Eight: Contributions to the Theoretical Debates in Political Science, Sociology, Law, and Economics Chapter Nine: Conclusions and Implications for Global Governance |
Cote : | E3-BUT-2011 |
URL / DOI : | https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400838790 |
Exemplaires (1)
Code-barres | Cote | Support | Localisation | Section | Disponibilité |
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26967 | E3-BUT-2011 | Papier | Centre de documentation | Espace Thématique | Disponible |